

INTERNATIONAL *Security* News Clipping Service

Published BiWeekly

A Project of the
Topsfield Foundation, Inc.

August 23, 1989
Volume 3, Number 16

A4 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1989

Poland's Rush Toward Democracy May Soon Jolt Others in East Bloc

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Poland's breathtaking move toward forming a non-Communist government shows that liberalization in the East bloc is accelerating and soon could spill over to other parts of the Soviet empire, U.S. analysts say.

Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski, who crushed the Solidarity trade movement eight years ago, tentatively approved Solidarity's plan to form a non-Communist coalition government, according to reports from Warsaw. The decision, which could be announced formally today, would produce the first non-Communist government in Eastern Europe in more than four decades.

Of course, Poland's march toward political openness could be halted by a violent crackdown, as various other attempts at reform in the Communist world have been in the past. But if democracy is permitted to take root in Poland, U.S. analysts believe that the forces of liberalization, which also are at work in Hungary, could next spread to nearby Czechoslovakia and feed the drive toward autonomy from Moscow that already is under way in the Baltic states.

"We think that Czechoslovakia might be next in line in terms of reform," says a Bush administration official. "Poland also will have an effect on the Baltics. In a world of instant communications, word gets around."

'Prague Spring'

While the velocity of change in Poland is likely to reinforce reform movements elsewhere in the Soviet empire, analysts predict it also will help conservative forces unite against what they see as the turmoil unleashed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program. For now, Mr. Gorbachev appears to be firmly in control, but as Poland heads into uncharted waters, it

is impossible to predict what the ultimate outcome will be.

The Soviets ruthlessly crushed Czechoslovakia's last attempt at political liberalization, the so-called "Prague Spring" of 1968. This coming Monday marks the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Now, however, "If Moscow allows 'Prague Spring' to go forward in Poland, how can you prevent it in Czechoslovakia?" asks Jiri Valenta, director of the University of Miami's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies.

Still, underscoring the uncertainty surrounding recent reform developments in the East bloc, Mr. Valenta adds, "I'm sure that the commanders of the Warsaw Pact forces are horrified."

The Bush administration, recognizing the conflicting pressures, is reacting cautiously to the developments in Poland. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the U.S. supports the "process of pluralism" under way in Poland, but he emphasized that the U.S. wouldn't interfere in that process. The spokesman said that President Bush hadn't placed any telephone calls to leaders in Poland and understands the pressure on Lech Wałęsa, Solidarity's leader.

Moscow appears willing to permit non-Communists to attempt to revive Warsaw's faltering economy so long as the Soviet Union's security interests are protected. Mr. Wałęsa understands that there are lines drawn by the Soviets that his movement can't cross. For instance, even in a non-Communist Polish government, key security posts—such as the ministries of interior and defense—still would be controlled by pro-Soviet officials. And yesterday, the Solidarity leader said Poland would remain in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. "No matter who rules here must recognize this reality and we [Solidarity] will do so," he told a West German reporter....

THE WASHINGTON POST

A14 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1989

Congressmen Reassess Soviet Pullback Plans

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writer

MOSCOW, Aug. 8—The Soviet Union, in the midst of a promised unilateral reduction of military forces in Eastern Europe, is transferring some soldiers and equipment from disbanded divisions to other units in the region, Soviet military officials disclosed today.

Members of a U.S. congressional delegation visiting here said they

were surprised by the information, which they said suggests that Soviet military capabilities may not drop as much as foreseen by U.S. intelligence analysts after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the reduction last December.

This interpretation was challenged by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a military adviser to Gorbachev and former armed forces chief of staff, who said the shuffling of troops and equipment is part of a restructuring effort to make Soviet forces in the region more "defensive" rather than "offensive."

"This is not exactly what we thought was happening," said House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) in a meeting today between members of the congressional panel and its rough Soviet equivalent, a new defense

committee of the revamped Supreme Soviet. "What does it mean and why didn't everybody say this in the beginning?"

Sergei Rogov, deputy chairman of a Soviet citizens' panel established to monitor the troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, said the group raised similar questions during a visit to Soviet units in East Germany.

U.S. delegates said they heard nothing that called into question Gorbachev's general pledge to pull a total of 240,000 Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe, as well as 10,000 tanks and 8,500 artillery, for demobilizing. But U.S. officials interpreted Gorbachev's announced withdrawals last year to mean that the entire tank divisions, with all their equipment and troops, would be demobilized....

Part I/Sunday, July 23, 1989 *Los Angeles Times* A1

U.S. Shifts Nuclear Response Strategy

By ROBERT C. TOTH, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—Quietly and without any public debate, the Bush Administration is preparing drastic changes in the basic U.S. strategy for fighting a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, including the creation of new weapons so devastating that they could penetrate the deepest underground bunkers and "decapitate" the entire Soviet leadership.

The new strategy, designed to permit the United States to paralyze the Soviets' war-making capacity in the opening hours of a conflict, also calls for advanced new stealth reconnaissance planes capable of flying over four times the speed of sound to ferret out critical Soviet targets, including mobile missiles.

Remote sensing devices that could detect mobile missiles and command posts would be hidden inside the Soviet Union itself in an unprecedented penetration of Soviet territory. And the Administration hopes to build spy satellites so powerful that they could detect objects on Earth as small as three inches across.

Costly New Strategy

The new strategy, to be embodied in a revised version of a document called the Strategic Integrated Operations Plan, or SIOP, is now being developed at the Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha. It represents a radical and costly departure from past strategy.

Yet, awesome as the new weapons would be, many authorities are already condemning the new battle plan as likely to increase the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

The new weapons never will live up to their proponents' hopes, these critics say, but an avowed capacity

cont on p2 "Shifts"

IN THIS ISSUE

Global Transitions/
Military Strategy East & West
p1&2

Arms Talks
p3

Editorials/Letters/Op-Ed
p4&5

Defense Budget &
Weapons Development
p6&7

Other News
p8

Monday, August 14, 1989

New Military Chief Powell Inherits Strengthened Post

By Peter Grier WASHINGTON Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

GEN. COLIN POWELL is being tapped for a military position, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which has increased greatly in power and prestige in recent years.

The JCS chief has long been the top-ranking United States uniformed officer. But he used to be, basically, the first among equals, the man who ran the meetings with service chiefs of staff and conveyed their consensus on military issues to the president.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act changed all that. It made the chairman of the JCS the president's principal military adviser, charging him with passing along his personal views as well as those of the service chiefs.

The bill gave the JCS head complete control over the large joint staff in the Pentagon, power he did not have before. It reorganized the military chain of command so that the generals and admirals in charge of US field combatant organizations, such as Central Command, gave their advice directly to the JCS chairman.

Analysts following the Pentagon's implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act say that provisions affecting the Joint Chiefs have been largely carried out. But they add that the current chairman of the JCS, Adm. William Crowe, has not utilized the full extent of his new powers. By all accounts Admiral Crowe has continued to strive for consensus on contentious issues. If he wants to, General Powell can operate as a more independent voice.

"Powell will have the authority, should the opportunity arise, to stake out new ground for the chairman," says Dr. James Blackwell, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and director of a study of defense organization reform.

Despite all the grumbling from the Pentagon about the many high-ranking officers President Bush passed over, Powell was an obvious choice for JCS chairman. It is a post that requires honed political skills, and few in the US military have had as much exposure to the workings of high levels of government as Powell.

He was President Reagan's national security adviser after serving as deputy, and helped run the National Security Council in the aftermath of the Iran-contra revelations. He has commanded an Army Corps in Europe — an important career move not just for command experience, but for the exposure to NATO leaders.

cont. from p1, "Shifts"

thority to launch such weapons in a crisis.

All this also would increase the chances that the Soviets would launch their nuclear missiles inadvertently, Ball said.

If the United States wiped out the key Soviet political leaders early in a nuclear exchange, which will be more likely under the new war plan, then there might be no one left to halt the hostilities short of Armageddon, critics contend.

Beyond the specific arguments, the debate over the new SIOP has opened a small window on one of the most sensitive and closely guarded subjects in the whole realm of national security: the issue of targeting—the complex question of what kinds of targets American nuclear weapons should be aimed at and thus how many weapons the nation needs.

The judgments on targeting, however they are made, add up to decisions on the nation's basic strategy for using nuclear weapons—how best to deter attack and how best to prosecute a nuclear war.

The new war plan, tentatively designated SIOP-7, has been in preparation for about a year. The guidance for developing SIOP-7 came initially from the Ronald Reagan Administration, and it will take President Bush's direct orders to reconsider its course.

Thus far, the Bush Administration is pressing ahead with SIOP-7 despite the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers as a result of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's arms control initiatives and his program of domestic economic and political reforms.

Leon Sloss, a veteran targeting expert who headed President Jimmy Carter's nuclear review and is now a defense consultant, said that a possibly temporary thaw in relations must not lull the United States into complacency. And until a new arms reduction treaty takes hold, the United States will continue to have more than 12,000 weapons that must be aimed at something, Sloss said....

U.S. Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 16 — Soviet scientists fired up a high-powered laser to day and blasted a sheet of metal in an unusual demonstration of their laser technology for American experts.

The gas laser was fired at a laboratory that had previously been off limits to foreigners. Soviet officials said the veil of secrecy at the laser lab was temporarily lifted to assure the West that Moscow was concentrating on nonmilitary laser research and not trying to develop lasers to use against satellites or incoming missiles.

"Militarily, there was not much significance to this laser," he said. "Other weight reduction would be necessary to make it a military system."

A Groundbreaking Tour

The trip to the laser research laboratory was another first in a 10-day tour of Soviet military sites by members of the House Armed Services Committee Institute on the outskirts of Moscow and other American military specialists.

American experts said the demonstration at a branch of the Kurchatov Institute on the outskirts of Moscow had given them important new information about Soviet research on gas lasers.

On Tuesday, during a visit to an SS-11 base about 200 miles northeast of Moscow, the Americans became the first to descend into a command bunker for a Soviet nuclear missile....

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, August 13, 1989 8

Gorbachev criticises radical wing

By John Rettie in Moscow

THE new-look Supreme Soviet ended its first session last week after just over five weeks of behaving more like an argumentative Western parliament than at any time since Stalin turned the Revolution's legislation into a rubber stamp.

In a closing speech, President Gorbachev expressed concern over the recent wave of ethnic and industrial unrest but he denied there was panic in the Kremlin.

"This is not panic, this is what we call *perestroika*," he said. "To tell you openly, we did not have a single quiet day in the last 1½ months. The Supreme Soviet, as well as party and Soviet bodies, get directly involved in all events and conflict situations these days."

President Gorbachev reserved some of his harshest words for a newly formed radical faction which looks like developing into the first legal opposition group in more than 70 years of Soviet power.

He condemned "provocative appeals" made by some members of the faction, the Inter-regional Group, which is headed by a panel

of five including the former Moscow party leader, Mr Boris Yeltsin, and the human rights activist, Dr Andrei Sakharov.

He also criticised the practice of some of the group's members of describing themselves as "left-radicals". About 400 members of the 2,250-seat Congress of People's Deputies, from which the Supreme Soviet was elected, have joined the group.

"Does this mean that other people should declare themselves centrists or even right wingers?" President Gorbachev asked. "I am unable to answer what good this will bring to our cause. Won't such artificial divisions lead to opposition on concrete questions with which our Supreme Soviet deals. Won't it make the resolution of problems — the thing which is demanded from us by electors — more difficult?"

The 542 deputies, elected from among the 2,250 members of the Congress of People's Deputies, displayed independent tendencies that belied reformers' fears that they would be a weighty conservative shackle on President Gorbachev's *perestroika*....

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1989

Soviets Are Trying Out Legislative

Oversight of the Military A

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

ALMA-ATA, U.S.S.R., Aug. 13 — On a bus hurtling through the Soviet countryside, Col. Valery N. Ochirov explained how he was named a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Piloting a MI-8D transport helicopter, he maneuvered the craft low into a canyon in Afghanistan to rescue wounded Soviet soldiers. In spite of enemy fire, the helicopter returned unscathed.

These days, however, Colonel Ochirov's challenges are more political than military.

As a deputy chairman of the newly formed Defense and State Security Committee, the 39-year-old colonel, a member of the Congress of People's Deputies from the Kalmyk region of the Soviet Union, is at the center of a political experiment with potentially far-reaching consequences for Soviet military policy.

The defense committee is part of the Supreme Soviet's nascent, and largely untested, effort to establish a system of legislative oversight for national security decisions. Members of the panel say the committee will review Soviet military spending plans as well as proposals for cutting and restructuring the Soviet military.

"Yazov is going to have to appear before our committee to defend his argument about why a particular program is necessary for defense," Colonel Ochirov said, referring to Dmitri T. Yazov, the Soviet Defense Minister.

"We can redistribute the funds and reprogram," added the colonel, who emerged from the Afghan war not only as a hero but as a sharp critic of Soviet military strategy in that conflict.

For the last week Colonel Ochirov and other members of the new defense committee have joined members of the United States House Armed Services Committee and a group of American experts on a whirlwind tour of military sites around the Soviet Union....

A farewell to arms

Hella Pick

THE speed of progress at the East-West conventional arms talks has been "breathtaking," according to the chief US negotiator, Stephen Ledgar. His optimistic verdict was delivered as negotiators broke up in Vienna for the summer.

And Mr Richard Burt, who leads the US team at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — Start — claims that "good progress" has been made during the latest round, although he recognises that little headway has been made on crucial gut issues, which have long divided the superpowers as they seek an agreement to halve their strategic arsenals.

The third strand of arms talks — the 40-nation chemical weapons ban negotiations — still have more than a week to go before adjournment. But already the chief US negotiator, Max Friedersdorf, has warned against too much hope after "tentative" progress in contacts between the US and the Soviet Union. He says there is still a long way to go on the long road to a convention outlawing chemical weapons.

There are few common denominators to these negotiations except for the recognition that fool-proof verification measures against cheating are essential. Another is that treaties must now be written far more carefully, and without the kind of ambiguity that characterises, for example, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty's reference to space weapons research and development.

The separate character of the three negotiations is dictated by the fact that Vienna's Conventional Forces in Europe talks — CFE — are restricted to the members of Nato and the Warsaw Pact; that Start involves only the two superpowers; and that 40 disparate countries are directly involved in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The US and the Soviet Union, the only countries taking part in all three negotiations, firmly deny that there is any political linkage between them, or that the conventional arms negotiations are being given priority over Start or over the chemical weapons ban. Yet to the extent that the arms control negotiations remain a vital barometer of East-West relations, especially of superpower relations, the overall picture matters as much as the analysis of its individual components.

As governments make their end-of-round assessments, the Soviet Union is bound to conclude that the change-over at the White House acted as a brake on arms negotiations while the new President reviewed security policy. Mr Bush made up for some of this at the Nato summit in May, where he made his dramatic bid for radical US and Soviet troops cuts in Europe down to 275,000 on each side.

At the Start negotiations, the superpowers are still largely probing each other. The Bush Administration is very much on hold, while it awaits the outcome of the congressional debate over the defence budget, and the cash allocations for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), for mobile missiles and for the B-2 Stealth bomber, all of which will have a major bearing on the US negotiating posture at Start.

The Russians are also finding that Mr James Baker, the new US Secretary of State, lacks the detailed knowledge of arms control his predecessor, Mr George Shultz, and that he does not yet have enough enthusiasm for this highly specialised form of diplomacy.

The Americans, as they analyse Soviet arms control policy, are wondering whether President Gorbachev, preoccupied with his domestic crisis, and anxious to release

THE NEW YORK TIMES A11 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1989 SOVIETS BACK U.S. ON NUCLEAR PLAN

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — The Soviet Union has accepted a proposed American method on monitoring underground nuclear tests but has attached a condition unacceptable to the United States, Administration officials said today.

In long negotiations over how to verify compliance with two treaties completed in the mid-1970's that limit the yield of nuclear tests, the United States has insisted on a method of measuring explosions that requires installation of a device immediately adjacent to the test hole in which the nuclear weapon is detonated.

The Soviet Union has insisted on seismic devices that can be placed hundreds of miles from the test site, measuring the shock wave from a nuclear explosion as it moves through the earth. Soviet officials have argued that seismic measuring is both more accurate and less intrusive.

The Senate has yet to approve the two treaties, which were set aside by the Reagan and Bush Administrations until Washington was satisfied Soviet compliance could be adequately monitored.

Called 'Good Progress'

The Administration officials said they took the Soviet acceptance of the American method as an encouraging sign but not a breakthrough in the current round of negotiations that ended in Geneva today. The head of the United States delegation, C. Paul Robinson, called it "good progress."

Noting that the Soviet acceptance of the American method "would be conditional upon American acceptance" of seismic measuring, Mr. Robinson said "the U.S. side has to react very carefully to the proposals...."

THE NEW YORK TIMES A1 THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1989 KREMLIN ACCEPTS EARLY INSPECTION ON CHEMICAL ARMS

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2 — In a move that could ease the completion of a treaty banning chemical weapons, the

military resources for the civilian sector, will be very pliable at the arms negotiations.

But US officials suspect that there could also be a very different scenario under which Mr Gorbachev, mindful of the overriding need to preserve the military's support, will take great care to consider their interests and avoid any arms concession that might alienate them. This could slow down the negotiations, even where they are at their most promising, in Vienna.

THE WASHINGTON POST WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1989 A17 Soviets Offer Plan to Limit Air-Launched Cruise Missiles

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

Soviet arms negotiators recently proposed a new approach to limiting air-launched cruise missiles that is similar to a plan endorsed by the U.S. Air Force but not yet decided by the Bush administration, U.S. officials said yesterday.

They said the new Soviet proposal is to be studied during a review of U.S. positions on key aspects of a new strategic arms control agreement in preparation for a meeting in Wyoming between Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze Sept. 19-20.

The establishment of limits on air-launched cruise missiles is considered one of four major unresolved issues in the long-running negotiations. The other issues, on which the two sides have recently made no substantial progress, are limitations on space weapons, sea-launched cruise missiles, and mobile missiles.

Washington's longstanding view has been that strategic bombers should be counted as carrying 10 of

For information on semester-long student subscriptions write to International Security News Clipping Service, PO Box 203, Pomfret, CT 06258 or call (203) 928-2616.

Soviet Union has accepted an American demand that inspections be carried out before an agreement is formally concluded, Administration officials said today.

The officials, who asked not to be identified, said the Soviet acceptance would help resolve one of the major disputes remaining between the two countries. It was conveyed in a paper presented to Secretary of State James A. Baker III by Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union when they met recently in Paris.

The Soviet move follows noteworthy progress made by the two sides during a recent round of talks at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Thorny issues still need to be resolved, however.

Timing Has Been an Issue

Moscow and Washington have previously disagreed on whether inspections of chemical weapons stockpiles should begin before or after a treaty is initiated, or formally concluded. The accord would be initiated by negotiators before its formal signing by each country's head of state.

The United States has said that data on chemical weapons stockpiles should be exchanged and confirmed through

the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, even though each aircraft can actually carry more than double that number. It has pursued this policy in an effort to avoid a drastic reduction in bomber forces when overall U.S. nuclear forces are trimmed under the accord.

Moscow, in contrast, demanded until recently that each bomber be counted as carrying the maximum possible number of cruise missiles. Just before the negotiations in Geneva recessed on Monday, however, the Soviets suggested instead that bombers be counted as carrying no more than the actual number of missiles installed in a given period.

Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, the chief Soviet negotiator, told a news conference in Geneva on Monday that "we look forward to a constructive response from the U.S. side to our proposal" on the weapons.

The Air Force, which has said it will actually deploy fewer than the maximum possible number of air-launched cruise missiles, embraced a similar approach shortly before the arms negotiations began under President Bush in June....

inspections before an agreement is concluded. Moscow has insisted that inspections should not be carried out until after the such a pact is formally concluded.

American officials have argued that early inspections are needed to help resolve a dispute between Moscow and the West over the size of the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile.

Dispute Over Numbers

Moscow says that it has no more than 50,000 tons of chemical armaments. But some Western intelligence analysts have put the Kremlin supplies at more than 300,000 tons.

"This is a sign that the Soviets are serious about concluding a chemical disarmament treaty," said Elisa D. Harris, an expert on the chemical weapons talks at the Brookings Institution, the Washington-based research and policy analysis institute.

She said the Soviets' move reflects the realization that they must address Western concerns about the size and composition of their stockpile.

"The only way they can deal with those concerns is by opening up their facilities to inspection," Ms. Harris said....

Two Superpowers Climbing the High Road Up From Hostility

By Charles William Maynes

WASHINGTON

George Bush's recent visit to Poland featured the bizarre spectacle of an American President praising a Polish dictator. Yet Bush's support of now-elected Wojciech Jaruzelski helps legitimize public debate on a genuine dilemma facing the United States in Eastern Europe.

The United States wants to free the East Europeans without offending the Soviets. It wants change in the political order in Eastern Europe but is wary of change in the security order.

Is the former possible without the latter? Even today, many observers doubt that the Soviets will be able to accept changes now under way in Eastern Europe. They anticipate an explosion that will end the promise of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's revolution. In the words of a recent RAND Corp. study, "Today, Eastern Europe's persisting structural instability poses the greatest single threat of a major discontinuity in international politics."

Events in Eastern Europe could indeed spin out of control, but part of the great pessimism many experts express about future Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe may rest on a dated view of East-West relations.

Many, perhaps most, Western observers see Gorbachev as an aberration. In terms of attitudes toward Eastern Europe, the majority of Soviet leaders are seen as little changed from the 1950s. But it can be argued that ever since the death of Josef Stalin, the Soviet Union has been making fitful efforts to become a normal member of the international community. Gorbachev's genius would then lie, not in

discontinuity, but in so accelerating the pace of change that the West at last begins to recognize it.

Looking back, we can see roughly four periods in East-West relations since 1945.

The Cold War, 1945-55: Soviet consolidation of control in Eastern Europe and American consolidation of influence in Western Europe. New lines of hostility were drawn down the center of Europe.

But any permanent "cold" required an enemy incapable of evolving into a more normal international partner. Stalin's death in 1953 began the evolution. As soon as the regime stopped shooting people, cracks started appearing in the totalitarian structure and the Soviets began their journey toward normality. By 1955 the stage was set for Stalin himself to be denounced officially—and he was at the 20th Party Congress the following year.

Defense of the status quo, 1955-65: The two sides essentially tested boundaries of the postwar division of power but they drew back from any ultimate challenge to those boundaries. Each side attempted to stir rebellion in the other camp. But the invasion of Hungary, the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis established just how stable the new status quo already was.

Détente, 1965-1975: With boundaries firmly set, the two sides could begin cautiously exploring areas of common interest within an established security framework. The fruits of this effort were the non-proliferation treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Wary cooperation, 1975-Present: Although boundaries were fixed in Europe, they had remained fluid in the Third

World. Superpower conflict centered in the Third World but both sides quickly learned that they had to observe certain rules of the road. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan acted according to a certain code of conduct, however brutal. Like the United States, the Soviet Union did not invade the neighboring state that gave provisions to the forces it was fighting. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union used enormous power in Afghanistan but stopped short of applying its full might. And like the United States, the Soviet Union also did not allow its anger—when the great rival helped feed the rebellion—to end relations with the United States.

It may be that the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan finally established the code of conduct in Third World crises. With such behavior established, cooperation could begin between the two superpowers in resolving some of these conflicts.

Can the process now be extended to understandings between superpowers about political change in their respective areas of influence? There is no clear reason why the answer should be negative. Either by itself or with other regional powers, no country in Eastern Europe or Central America threatens the security of the Soviet Union or the United States. Only when political change in these areas becomes linked in some way to the foreign-policy designs of either superpower do security considerations come into play. In other words, there is no reason for a Brezhnev Doctrine or a Monroe Doctrine if there is no extra-regional power attempting to take advan-

tage of political change in a way that could tilt the global balance.

Some months ago, Henry A. Kissinger was heavily criticized because one of his columns was interpreted to suggest a second Yalta, another great-power effort to arrange the affairs of Europe. A real attempt at condominium would be overreaching and would fail. But there is no reason why the superpowers cannot reassure one another about actions taken as inevitable change takes place in regions of special concern and sensitivity. Thus Moscow and Washington could each:

—Reaffirm that its principal concern was national security, not the internal order of neighboring states.

—Reassure neighboring states that it understood its commitments under the U.N. Charter regarding the use of force.

—Pledge publicly that it would not seek nor accept military facilities or special privileges of any sort in the zone of concern to the other side. (Consistent with that pledge, Moscow could pledge to withdraw military personnel from Cuban soil once Washington had succeeded in establishing normal diplomatic relations with Cuba.)

There may yet be a tragedy in Eastern Europe. But even in that event, the process of Soviet international normalization is not likely to come to a permanent halt. The process begun so long ago will one day resume. As international politics become less ideological, the Soviet Union can relax its grip on Eastern Europe just as the United States can relax its grip on its own region. We should all hope that day comes sooner rather than later. □

Charles William Maynes is the editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine.

Los Angeles Times

Part II / Tuesday, July 25, 1989

7

Gorbachev Sees Vein of Opportunity to Be Mined From Worker Unrest

By JERRY F. HOUGH

The spring and early summer of 1989 have been times of political and social turmoil in the Soviet Union. Yet, while many have been treating the latest round of coal strikes as the beginning of the end for *perestroika*, the labor unrest is actually being used by Mikhail S. Gorbachev to accelerate economic reform.

The coal strikes do not come as a surprise. Only 20% of the regional Communist Party leaders were defeated in the elections of March 26, but candidates from the coal-mining regions were particularly vulnerable. Then the extremely poor conditions in the coal fields were the subject of heated speeches at the televised Congress of People's Deputies that met in late May and early June. That workers would follow up with action of their own was a natural development.

The strikes, however, are far more than a traditional call for higher wages. The key demands are usually those associated with management—higher prices, with local mines receiving a proportion of the hard currency earned by the sale of their coal abroad. When the miners say they support *perestroika*, they don't just mean the right to strike. They are calling for radical economic reform.

The cause of the miners' concern is obvious. In the crazy-quilt system of Soviet

pricing, coal is one of the items that is sold below cost to other factories. So long as the miners are paid wages out of the state budget, they don't care about prices. But with the new laws calling for self-financing (the payment of costs out of receipts), abnormally low coal prices mean a cut in wages to miners.

The crucial fact about the coal strikes is not that they occurred, but that they have received so much attention—often sympathetic—in the controlled Soviet media. The reason is that they could not come at a better time: the eve of a major Central Committee plenum on nationalities.

The plenum will deal first with decentralization of authority to the Soviet republics. As such, Russians are uneasy that Gorbachev is being too weak with the non-Russians and making too many concessions to them. The coal strike gives Gorbachev the ability to say that this decentralization is being demanded by Russians, too—and by one of the core elements of the old working class. It also will legitimize a continuation of the very thorough purge of conservatives that he has been conducting over the last year.

We in the West desperately need to keep these events in perspective. For four years a number of observers have been saying that Gorbachev is teetering, that he is riding an uncontrollable tiger. As proof, they cite each incident of turmoil.

Yet every serious Western analysis—and surely the Soviet leaders themselves understand this point—notes that political reform will produce additional tensions to keep the political cauldron boiling.

The question has always been: Would this be the kind of escalating tension and political activity that has toppled many authoritarian regimes around the world and brought political democracy? Or would it be the kind of political turmoil we saw in America and Western Europe in the 1960s that would subside with time and a change in policy?

In my view the latter is the case. Gorbachev is not riding a tiger. He is a Cossack firmly in control of his horse as he moves through tough terrain.

Paradoxically, the saving factor for Gorbachev is the nationality conflict. The non-Russians are divided and can be controlled through a combination of concessions and repression. The first big riots—and bloodshed—occurred in Kazakhstan in 1986, when a Russian was named first secretary of that republic's Communist Party. Yet he proved a skillful leader; last March, virtually none of 25 top leaders lost in the Kazakh elections.

The Russians in turn can be restrained

cont. on p5, "Unrest"

Fueling the Soviet Strikes: 'Where's the Borscht?'

By MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

When Soviet miners began to walk out of the coal pits, they brought to a head the most serious challenge facing Mikhail S. Gorbachev — how to improve the life of the Soviet consumer. This is a paradoxical situation. Outside the Soviet Union, Gorbachev is applauded as the world's leading statesman. Within the country, however, he is criticized because of what most Soviet citizens see as the deterioration of their day-to-day standard of living.

Having just returned from Moscow, I can understand why the miners have been moved to take such extreme action. They, like their comrades all over the Soviet Union, find themselves facing shortages that never existed even in Leonid Brezhnev's "years of stagnation." Admittedly, the supply of consumer goods has always been erratic in the Soviet Union. But not since the late 1940s have there been so many shortages at once. Even Moscow, a city usually well supplied, now has had shortages in the last month that encompass not only meat, milk and butter, but cheese, sausage, sugar, tea, matches and even salt.

The consumer supply situation is no better outside the capital, and often quite worse. That is why the miners' demands include such unusual concerns as soap, laundry detergent and disposable syringes, as well as more and better apartments. Nor is this likely to be just a temporary crisis. Otto Latsis, a leading Soviet economist, has predicted that if the shortage of goods that began in 1988 continues for another year, "there will be empty shelves and trade will simply cease to exist."

Because they see no end to the deteriorating economic situation, the miners in the Kuznets Basin of Siberia decided to protest in the only way available to them. They were not the first to do so.

Already this year there have been more than 100 strikes throughout the Soviet Union.

This is one unintended consequence of *glasnost*. There were periodic strikes in the pre-Gorbachev days, but they were never publicized. Now the miners appear on television, and this gives ideas to others whose economic situation is no better. As a result, there are now more workers on strike in the Soviet Union than at any time since the revolution. This is hardly a comforting thought for Gorbachev or the conservatives around him who already fear that the society is beginning to unravel.

The tragedy, particularly in the coal industry, is that the strikes are bound to cause even more economic shortages. Coal accounts for 20% of the Soviet Union's

energy supply. Already there are fears of more brownouts. Some metallurgical factories have already begun to cut back on production for fear they will not have enough coal to operate. Coal is also important for the operation of the already overburdened Soviet railroads. If some trains are canceled for a lack of fuel or electricity, the economic system may soon come to a halt.

To answer the miners' demands, Gorbachev will have to come up with more consumer goods. But since there are shortages all over the country, he will probably have to search for supplemental supplies outside the country. This will take convertible currency, which the Soviet Union lacks — so it will have to borrow. Even then, the imported goods may soon disappear into the black market. The problem is that the Soviet budget is unbalanced. The budget deficit exceeds 11% of the gross national product. The only way Gorbachev can pay the government's bills is to print money. No wonder that in 1988 the money supply increased twice as fast as it did in 1987. This extra money has fueled inflation, which now exceeds 10% a year.

These are not easy days for Gorbachev. He has been in power for more than four years now and the people are beginning to ask, "Where's the borscht?"

It is not enough that he had to worry about cooling tempers between different nationality groups within the Soviet Union. So far, he has been unable to resolve any of these conflicts and if anything, the number of skirmishes seems to be increasing.

In the same way, the economic conflicts show no sign of diminishing. To end the strike Gorbachev has agreed to grant some concessions to some of the miners. But this is likely to lead to more strikes because other groups are likely to conclude that striking is the only way to improve their lot. This of course only causes more economic stress.

All this is too much for some, especially the conservatives. They attribute the strikes as well as the ethnic rioting to Gorbachev's permissive policies. They also blame him personally for the economic shortcomings of the *perestroika* process.

Gorbachev is not the only leader in history to be applauded overseas and criticized at home. However, if he is to continue in power, he will have to perform near-miracles at home. Unfortunately, the prospects are not very bright.

Marshall I. Goldman is a professor of Soviet economics at Wellesley College and associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University.

cont. from p4, "Unrest"

by appeals to national unity. The Siberian workers or Moscow students know that if they successfully push for complete democracy, separatist parties will emerge everywhere and some areas will leave the union. They are not ready for this.

That is why Gorbachev can afford to publicize the strikes and the national

demands in such an apparently reckless manner. The non-Russians will get the greater autonomy they seek, and that will help pacify them. The Russians too will get greater local independence and a rising standard of living.

But the non-Russians making the most extreme demands will be kept in check. The troops will be called out periodically,

The Myth of the Soviet 'Killer' Laser

By Frank von Hippel
and Thomas B. Cochran

WASHINGTON The Defense Department has for years argued that the Soviet Union is way ahead in the development of ground-based lasers that can knock out satellites.

The department has pointed in particular to a facility at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan, which was alleged to contain a laser weapon that "could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a ballistic-missile defense role in the future."

We visited this facility in early July and found some very ordinary lasers. Their beams were 1,000 times less powerful than those of the Mid-infrared Chemical Laser (MIRACL) at the Strategic Defense Initiative's White Sands, N.M., proving ground.

Thus the department's representation of the "laser gap" — like the bomber gap and the missile gap before it — seems to have been the reverse of the truth. What can we learn from the explosion of this myth?

The first lesson is for the Soviets, whose pathological secrecy allowed

Lessons for the U.S. and Moscow.

the myth of the Soviet "killer" laser to flourish as a Defense Department fund-raising device for more than five years. To deflate the campaign, they needed only to open up the Sary Shagan facility and reveal the paltriness of its lasers.

Their long delay has provided the rationale for a major U.S. investment in anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile programs that the Soviets may feel compelled to match.

This week's Soviet demonstration to American experts of a high-power gas laser is another encouraging sign that Moscow is bringing *glasnost* to the new Soviet national security strategy. The laser was fired at a laboratory that, like Sary Shagan,

as was the National Guard in America in the 1960s. This does not mean the system is collapsing or reform is over. The sky is not falling. We have to get on with developing a policy, not dreaming that it will.

Jerry F. Hough is a professor of political and policy sciences at Duke University and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

previously had been off limits to foreigners.

The second lesson — for the U.S. — concerns the importance of having unbiased sources of information as a basis for national security policy.

As we learned after our return, the capabilities of the Soviet laser facility had been hotly disputed within the intelligence community for a number of years. The assessment of the Central Intelligence Agency was apparently consistent with what we found.

The uncertainties about what kind of laser was actually at Sary Shagan was apparently acknowledged by the intelligence experts in secret briefings. Defense Department officials, however, decided to present only a worst-case assessment in the agency's unclassified publications.

These misleading publications became part of the conventional wisdom — even to some extent in the minds of many who had received C.I.A. briefings — and had an important influence on Congressional budgetary decisions.

Any Congressman with more than a year's experience should know better than to rely on the Pentagon's representations of the "Soviet threat," since military funding depends upon maximizing the dangers.

However, publications such as "Soviet Military Power," which have so distorted the national policy making process, are underwritten by Congressionally approved funds. While it's important that such information be available to the public, Congress should insist upon publication by a less self-interested agency.

Congress will decide the future of anti-satellite weapons research when it takes up the defense authorization bill after Labor Day. The House bill includes a ban on testing the MIRACL laser and urges the Administration to negotiate a ban on all anti-satellite weapons. Since neither measure was included in the Senate version, the final decision will rest with a conference committee.

Clearly, Congress should not reward the Pentagon for inflating threats. To launch a new arms race in anti-satellite weapons would undermine our national security as much as the Soviet Union's. □

Frank von Hippel is professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University. Thomas B. Cochran is senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JULY 31, 1989

A1 **Restarting Weapons Reactors To Cost 4 Times the Estimate**By KEITH SCHNEIDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 30 — Westinghouse, the operator of the country's largest nuclear weapons plant, has notified the Government that it will cost more than four times the previous estimate to repair and restart three reactors that are the only source of a gas vital to atomic warheads.

The repair program at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina is likely to be among the most costly and intricate faced by the plant's owner, the Energy Department, as it moves to clean up and modernize its entire 12-state nuclear weapons complex.

National Security Debated

The overhaul of the Savannah River reactors represents a test with substantial consequences for the department. The plant, on a 300-square-mile reservation near Aiken, S.C., is the nation's sole source of tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen that increases the explosive force in nuclear warheads. It decays steadily and must regularly be replenished.

The plant's three operable reactors have been turned off for more than a year, a situation the Defense Department has said compromises the readiness of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Pentagon

officials said in October that unless a reactor is restarted by the end of this summer, older warheads might need to be deactivated to recover their tritium for use in other weapons.

But experts with independent arms control groups said that the military was overstating the threat and that the Energy Department would not further delay restarting the first reactor if the shortage was severe enough to endanger national security.

Department Will Pay

In December the Energy Department estimated that repairs at the plant would cost \$350 million and be completed in 1990. But a confidential report submitted to the department on June 26 by the Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the subsidiary of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation that operates the plant, said the project will cost at least \$1.66 billion and not be completed until 1991. Spending on the project will peak in the 1990 fiscal year at \$465 million, according to the report.

The Energy Department pays for operation of the Savannah River plant, and the additional money will come from the department's budget. . . .

B2 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

Plan to Correct Environmental Problems At Atomic Weapons Plants Is Unveiled

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Energy Department unveiled a five-year \$19.5 billion program to correct environmental and health problems at the nation's atomic weapons plants — the first part of a cleanup that officials predict will take 30 years and cost many billions more.

In a speech, Energy Secretary James Watkins provided a blueprint for the initial phase, acknowledging that even an optimistic timetable "passes much of the burden to the next generation."

After a top-level review of the shortcomings in environmental-protection and health-protection measures at the government nuclear facilities, the department said it proposes to spend \$2.4 billion in the fiscal year starting Oct. 1 to help correct the shortcomings. After that, the annual bill is expected to increase steadily, peaking at more than \$4 billion in both fiscal 1994 and 1995. For the entire cleanup effort, which will stretch well into the next century, the cost has been estimated at anywhere from \$90 billion to \$150 billion.

The money, which must still be approved by Congress, would be used to clean up pollution where federal and state safety laws are violated, repair faulty

equipment and develop new procedures and technology for future waste disposal, the department said.

The plan commits the department to develop a cleanup priority list, containing known contamination and assessing the extent of yet-unknown hazards. The department also said it will release health records of workers at weapons facilities for scientific evaluation to determine the extent of risk.

Most of the \$19.5 billion will be used at 17 nuclear-weapons plants in a dozen states, but some funds would be allocated for cleanup efforts at more than 70 other government nuclear facilities, most of which have long been closed, officials said.

Among the sites considered to be heavily contaminated are the Rocky Flats plutonium-processing plant in Colorado; the Savannah River weapons plant in South Carolina; the Fernald uranium processing plant in Ohio; the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls; and the Hanford Reservation in eastern Washington state.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9
SATURDAY, AUGUST 5, 1989

HOUSE CUTS FUNDS FOR THE MILITARY

By SUSAN F. RASKY

Special to The New York Times

spending bill until Congress returns from its summer recess in September.

Mr. Bush's advisers have said they would recommend that he veto the military spending bill in its present form.

\$1.2 Billion for the F-14

The Administration had requested \$1.2 billion for research and development of the advanced fighter, which is intended to replace the Air Force F-15 and the Navy F-14 fighters in the late 1990's. But last week the House insisted on keeping production going on the F-14, which is built by the Grumman Corporation of Bethpage, Long Island. Today's spending measure provides money for 24 new F-14's and improvements to 12 existing planes, at a cost of \$1.26 billion for the new planes and \$107 million for the improvement program.

Language in the committee report accompanying the spending bill does direct the Navy to plan for an orderly shutdown of F-14 production once the 24 new planes are received. The military budget bill adopted last week made no such stipulation.

The spending bill cuts \$2 billion from the amount requested by the Administration for a variety of classified weapons programs, including development of the advanced cruise missile. The radar-evading missile, which is launched from an aircraft, is part of the Administration's program to improve long-range attack abilities. . . .

Nunn Defense of Compromise

Senator Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee and was one of those who worked out the compromise, argued today that the "compromise has been carefully crafted."

Noting the votes last week in the House, he said similar action by the Senate would leave "a totally irrational, unsound" set of bills when the two chambers meet in a conference in September to reconcile their versions of the 1990 military budget bill.

In a minor setback to the Administration, the Senate also adopted by a vote of 93 to 7 a nonbinding resolution saying that "it is not prudent or possible" at this point to decide whether the United States should buy the Stealth, or B-2, bombers at the rates necessary to complete the proposed fleet of 132 aircraft by the late 1990's. Under present plans, the Pentagon would buy only a few bombers for the next two years and then sharply increase the number of purchases.

Last week, the Senate voted to approve \$4.4 billion of the \$4.7 billion that the Bush Administration requested for the Stealth program in 1991, including the production of three new aircraft.

Restrictions of Stealth Plan

But it also put major restrictions on how and when that money can be spent, and today's resolution said the vote last week "does not constitute a commitment to support the procurement of large numbers of B-2 aircraft."

It said that before the Administration commits itself to high-rate production of the bomber, it should "carefully consider" the possibility of buying fewer than the 132 Stealth bombers proposed by the Pentagon. The Senate also said the Administration would

study the possibility of relying more on bombers that launch cruise missiles and less on those like the Stealth, which are intended to penetrate Soviet radar defense and drop nuclear bombs.

Several senators said their constituents had objected to the vote on the Stealth bomber last week, which many press reports had interpreted as an endorsement of the entire \$70 billion program and an important victory for the Administration.

Passage of today's resolution enabled the senators to record their reservations about the increasingly unpopular Stealth program without engaging in a major fight with the White House. Senate leaders have also been eager not to toughen the Stealth bomber provisions in the Senate bill too much to avoid giving up ground to the House before the budget measure goes to the conference committee. . . .

THE NEW YORK TIMES, A15
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

SENATE GIVES BUSH A MISSILES VICTORY

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 — The Senate gave President Bush a long-sought victory today in the dispute over the military budget by supporting a compromise under which the Pentagon would deploy two kinds of mobile land-based nuclear missiles.

The vote, 62 to 38, defeated an amendment to the 1990 military budget bill that was offered by Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan. It would have cut funds for the 10-warhead MX missile to about \$600 million, from \$1.1 billion. That would have caused a delay of about a year in plans to move the MX from underground silos to railroad cars to make them less vulnerable to attack.

The amendment was intended to register the Senate's opposition to a compromise between the White House and Congressional leaders under which the Pentagon would put the MX onto railroad cars and then buy the much smaller, single-warhead Midgetman. The Midgetman would be deployed on trucks.

Last week, the House repudiated that agreement, first by halving the MX budget and then by eliminating the Midgetman budget entirely, but the Senate had not taken up the issue until today.

A1

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1989

A Stealth bomber test flight was cut short after about an hour when a gauge indicated low oil pressure in an accessory drive for the \$530 million plane's hydraulic systems. The flight, which was to last for three to four hours, was the second for the controversial radar-evading bomber. The Air Force called the problem "minor."

* * *

A1

THE NEW YORK TIMES,
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1989

DESIGN FLAW SEEN AS FAILURE CAUSE IN TRIDENT 2 TESTS

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — The Navy believes designers made a fundamental miscalculation in building its biggest nuclear missile, the Trident 2, which has failed in two of its three undersea tests, a Navy official said today.

The first missile exploded on March 21, four seconds after it was launched from a submarine off the east coast of Florida. The second test, on Aug. 2, went largely according to plan, but the third self-destructed on Tuesday.

Rear Adm. Kenneth C. Malley, head of the Navy's ballistic missile program, said that despite computer simulations, engineers seriously underestimated how much pressure is on the Trident 2 as it hurtles up through the water from its submarine launcher. He said they had also failed to anticipate the effect of "water jets" caused by the missile's movement.

Key Role in Nuclear Arsenal

The Trident 2, which is designed to carry up to eight large nuclear warheads, is scheduled for deployment aboard a new generation of submarines in the 1990's and is supposed to be the centerpiece of the sea-based leg of the American nuclear arsenal until the year 2032.

Until the test failures, the Trident 2 was the one element of the Defense Department's nuclear modernization program that was moving along smoothly.

cont. from pg8 "Arms"

Union as the country with the biggest military budget in the world, at \$303 billion in 1987. The US is a close second, at \$296 billion. Third by a long shot is France, at \$35 billion.

But while the Soviet Union is the No. 1 country, NATO is the biggest-spending military alliance. Its total spending is \$147 billion compared with \$364 billion spent by the Warsaw Pact.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with other developed nations such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland added in, account for more

than 80 percent of the world's military budget.

While the developed world's military spending has been rising for years, and continues to do so, the increase is now rather small — an average 1.9 percent for 1985 through 1987.

The third world is where military budgets have really been held down. Developing world arms spending leveled off after 1982, says ACDA, and has been mostly falling ever since. In 1987 it dropped 9.1 percent from the previous year. . . .

cont. from pg8 "New Zealand"

warships carrying nuclear weapons from its ports.

"We want to have dialogue with the Americans . . . but I would not want to suggest that there is going to be any immediate prospect of change"

Palmer's comments were a snub to the State Department which Monday called on the new prime minister to reassess the ban. . . .

A12 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1989

Senate Clears \$305 Billion Defense Bill

By ANDY PASZTOR

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Senate adopted a \$305 billion defense bill that strongly endorses President Bush's proposals for new strategic weapons but rejects parts of his spending plan for conventional arms.

The 95-4 vote approving the fiscal 1990 defense authorization bill puts the Senate squarely behind development of the most expensive weapons sought by the White House, including the B-2 Stealth bomber, a proposed space-based anti-missile shield, and a pair of mobile, land-based nuclear missile systems. "The basic goals of the president were met," said Virginia Sen. John Warner, the bill's Republican floor manager.

But the Senate's spending blueprint, hammered out during more than a week of frequently emotional debate, differs markedly from the House version of the bill, which sharply cuts spending on the Bush administration's top strategic priorities. House and Senate conferees are expected to face lengthy and difficult negotiations next month to resolve the disparities.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D., Ga.) said there are "more profound differences" between the House and Senate bills this year than at any time in recent memory. "We'll be interested in hearing [the] logic" behind the House positions, he told reporters after the vote. "It doesn't leap out at you."

THE WASHINGTON POST TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1989 A7

Defense Panel Eyes Plan for Burden-Sharing

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday introduced a package of proposals aimed at heading off troop reductions by Western European countries, prodding Japan to pay more of its defense costs and negotiating reduction of U.S. troop deployments in South Korea.

The so-called "burden-sharing" proposals were introduced by committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), Republicans John W. Warner

Rushing to dispose of a host of amendments and finish the bill before Congress's scheduled August recess begins at the end of the week, senators yesterday easily rejected efforts to restrict development and testing of anti-satellite weapons. The administration strongly opposes such restrictions.

But in a series of votes that kept lawmakers on the floor well past midnight Tuesday and into the night yesterday, the Senate approved substantial changes to other parts of the Bush defense package. Generally, the Senate bill beefs up production of a wide range of conventional weapons that weren't sought by the White House.

The bill, for example, substantially increases funding for various missiles, conventional ammunition, and infantry and anti-tank weapons in the fiscal year starting Oct. 1. And yesterday, without much debate or even a formal vote, senators approved non-binding language supporting continued work on the V-22. The estimated \$25 billion tilt-rotor transport for the Marine Corps was slated for elimination by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.

The Senate Armed Services Committee previously authorized only research money to continue development of the V-22, built by units of Boeing Co. and Textron Inc. But the supportive language adopted by the Senate greatly increases the chance that the final version of the bill will follow the House's lead and provide money to begin actual production of the troop transports, which are designed to take off like helicopter but cruise like a plane.

The Senate bill differs from the House version in several other important ways.

Overall, the House authorized \$2.5 billion less than the Senate for the B-2, land-based mobile missiles, and the proposed space-based anti-missile system known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. . . .

(Va.) and John McCain (Ariz.) and several other senior committee members.

They are expected to be approved by the Senate today as part of the \$305 billion defense authorization bill for fiscal 1990.


The proposals, approved last week by the committee, reflect mounting demand in Congress that U.S. allies take account of U.S. budget problems and assume more of the share of worldwide defenses, a circumstance that concerned Congress last year also.

The United States spends twice as much on defense as its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, although the allies have a combined gross national product exceeding that of the United States, Warner argued.

"There can be no free lunches and no free rides," Nunn added. . . .

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 1988

A15



THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Thursday, August 10, 1989

Arms Spending Slows Worldwide

By Peter Grier

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

GRÖWTH in world military spending has ground to a standstill, according to a new US government report.

Money devoted to the globe's armed forces is still at a record high of more than \$1 trillion a year. That is nearly 5 1/2 percent of all the goods and services produced by mankind.

But due largely to a decline in

the arms budgets of third-world nations, world military expenditures did not go up in 1987 for the first time since 1971, when the United States was winding down from the Vietnam war.

"Even if temporary, the spending lull in the developing world may offer an opportunity to develop and institute new international security conditions that could help forestall a resurgence in military spending," notes the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) study.

ACDA figures show the Soviet

cont. on pg 7 "Arms"

THE WASHINGTON POST

A18 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1989

New Zealand Prime Minister Endorses Nuclear Policy

WELLINGTON, New Zealand—New Zealand's new prime minister, Geoffrey Palmer, yesterday rejected a U.S. plea to rethink this country's anti-nuclear policy.

"Our nuclear policy will not be changed," Palmer told his first news conference after parliamentary caucus members elected him to succeed David Lange who resigned for reasons of health. New Zealand bans

cont. on pg 7 "New Zealand"

INTERNATIONAL Security

News Clipping Service is available for \$15 per year for US addresses, \$27 for Canadian addresses or \$33 for all other foreign addresses. This cost covers reproduction and postage for 14 issues.

Send check made out to International Security News

ISNCS, PO Box 203, Pomfret, CT 06258.

ISNCS is a biweekly publication monitoring newspaper coverage of issues related to international security. This service is designed to cover the highlights of events in this field and present the range of viewpoints reported in the national and international press. Further reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restriction.

Editor: Martha McCov

INTERNATIONAL Security

News Clipping Service

ROUTE 169, BOX 203, POMFRET, CONNECTICUT 06258

06/28/90
Daniel Ellsberg

A18 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1989

U.S. Has Given Nuclear-Weapons Data To Several Nations, Senate Panel Finds

By JOHN J. FIALKA

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee is investigating evidence that several countries believed to be working on clandestine nuclear-weapons programs have been getting sensitive information from three top Energy Department weapons laboratories.

Investigators found that the countries made 627 requests for information useful in making and testing nuclear weapons and that 484 were granted routinely. The recipients included Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, South Africa and Argentina.

The information falls in what one committee aide calls a "gray area"—highly technical details that aren't secret but would be very helpful to scientists working in bomb programs. It is a category of information that Congress ordered the department to protect in 1981, but General Accounting Office investigators say the agency has failed to do so.

A spokesman for the department said it has no immediate comment on the evidence, which was gathered for the committee by the GAO. "The matter is under review," he said.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1989 A1

U.S. WEAPON SALES TO THIRD WORLD INCREASE BY 66%

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 31 — American arms sales to the third world increased sharply last year and nearly matched Soviet sales, which declined from the previous year, the Congressional Research Service reported today.

American sales of weapons in 1988 rose by 66 percent from 1987 and Soviet sales fell by 47 percent in the same period. As a result, American arms sales to the third world, which previously lagged far behind Soviet sales, nearly equaled the Soviet level: \$9.9 billion for Moscow, \$9.2 billion for Washington.

The United States and Soviet Union

together accounted for nearly two-thirds of all arms sales to developing countries, the study said. The American share, 15 percent in 1987, jumped to 31 percent last year. The Soviet share, 50 percent of the total in 1987, fell to 33 percent.

Big Buyers in Mideast

The big increase in American sales is attributable to major "new orders" from traditional buyers and an agreement with Kuwait for the purchase of 40 F-18 aircraft and various missiles for an estimated \$1.9 billion," said the study, which is based on authoritative data from several Federal agencies, including intelligence agencies. The report is to be published later this week.

The Middle East was the largest arms market, receiving two-thirds of all weapons delivered to the third world in the last four years. The report documents the rapid growth of China as an arms supplier, noting that the value of its deliveries to the third world exceeded those of Britain, Italy and West Germany combined in the period from 1985 through 1988.

